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On a certain strong Cartesian conception of the mental, nothing in our mental life is hidden from us: if one is in a certain token mental state then one knows, or at least can easily come to know, via introspection, that one is in that state. On such a view, introspection is an absolutely reliable method of coming to know what mental states we are in. Nobody these days sponsors such a strong view of the mental, if anyone ever really did.​[2]​ The state of feeling angry, the state of feeling jealous, or the state of feeling schadenfreude, to name but three examples, are all mental states which one can be in and yet one can easily fail to know, via introspection, that one is in such a state—even if one is fully rational, functioning normally, and giving the matter one’s full attention.
	Still, the Cartesian conception survives in a variety of weaker forms. On one prominent weaker form, nothing in our core mental life is hidden from us: if one is in a core mental state then one knows, or at least can easily come to know, via introspection, that one is in such a state—where prototypical core mental states are such states as being in pain, feeling cold, and feeling hot. ​[3]​ On such a weaker view, introspection is still an absolutely reliable method—but only when introspecting such core mental states as these.​[4]​
	The aim in this paper is to show that not only is this weaker Cartesian conception is untenable, but that various even weaker conceptions are unworkable also. The first of these entails that if one is in a core mental state then one is in a position to form a justified belief, via introspection, that one is in such a state. The second retreats to the doxastic principle: if one is in a core mental state (and one has actively wondered whether one is in that state) then one believes, via introspection, that one is in that state. The third retreats to the principle: if one believes, via introspection, that one is in a certain mental state then one knows that one is in that mental state. The fourth retreats to the weaker principle of infallibility: if one believes, via introspection, that one is in a certain mental state then one is in that mental state. In other words, all the principles which have traditionally taken to be hallmarks of our (core) mental states must be given up. In order to show this, I offer a variety of (novel) conceptions of what it is for our introspective powers of discrimination to be less than perfect. The upshot is, I hope, a much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto.


2. Williamson on anti-luminosity.
  
One prominent set of doubts concerning the weak Cartesian conception that nothing in our core mental life is hidden from us concerns the absolute reliability of introspection.​[5]​ The worry is that since our introspective powers of discrimination are not absolutely perfect, then this conception is still too strong. But what does it mean to say that our introspective powers of discrimination are not absolutely perfect? Very roughly, it means that introspection is not sufficiently discriminatory to tell apart close cases. In other words, close cases are indiscriminable via introspection. As we shall see, there are various ways in which one can unpack such a thesis.
	Williamson (1994, 1996, 2000) suggests that it amounts to the following conception of limited discrimination:

(DIS1): If one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one knows, via introspection, one is in '.

For example, if one is in the state of feeling hot at time t, then for all one knows, via introspection, at some later time t plus one second, say, one feels hot. On that basis, Williamson provides an argument against the thesis that our core mental states are, what he terms, luminous, where a condition C is luminous for subject s just in case if C obtains then s is in a position to know, via introspection, that C obtains. If this argument is sound then there are no (non-trivial) luminous conditions. For that reason, Williamson alleges, we are ‘cognitively homeless’—there is no theatre of thought and experience within which our core mental states obtain and to which we have some special kind of epistemic access. Let’s review Williamson’s argument in a bit more detail.
	The thumbnail version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is as follows:​[6]​

The main idea behind the argument against luminosity is that our powers of discrimination are limited. If we are in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all we know we are in '. Thus what we are in a position to know in  is still true in '. Consequently a luminous condition obtains in  only if it also obtains in ', for it obtains in  only if we are in a position to know that it obtains in . In other words, a luminous condition obtains in any case close enough to cases in which it obtains (2000, p. 13).


We can unpack this argument as follows: Firstly, consider a gradual phenomenal transition whereby a subject s knows, at time t, that she feels hot, but does not feel hot, and so does not know she feels hot, at time t plus one hour, where at every state of this transition the subject is in a position to wonder whether or not they feel hot. At t, s forms the belief that they feel hot; at the end of the process, s forms the belief that they do not feel hot. Secondly, given our limited powers of discrimination with respect to introspection, then knowledge of the obtaining of a condition C (e.g. feeling hot) requires what Williamson calls ‘a margin for error’, as follows: 

(ME) For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know, via method M, that C obtains then C obtains in , (where  is close to ).​[7]​

Very roughly, ME says that one is in a position to know that C obtains only if it is not an easy possibility that C fails to obtain.​[8]​ This is just to say that if C obtains in , and case  is close enough to , then for all one is in a position to know, via M in , C obtains, which is just a version of DIS1.​[9]​ Thirdly, suppose that C is luminous: 

(L) For all cases , if C obtains in  then in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains. 

(see Williamson 2000 p. 95). Fourthly, ME plus L straightforwardly entail (via the transitivity of the conditional) the following soritical principle:

(SR) For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know that, via M, C obtains then in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains, (where  is close to ).

Given SR, and given that s is in a position to know via introspection that they feel hot at time t then s is in a position to know via introspection that they feel hot in all cases—in particular at time t plus one hour. But it is given that s does not feel hot at time t plus one hour and so s is not in a position to know that they feel hot at time t plus one hour—since being in a position to know is a factive state. Contradiction. Upshot: the condition of feeling hot is not luminous. Likewise for all other core mental states. Thus, the weak Cartesian Conception, under which these core mental states are taken to be luminous, must be abandoned. 
	There are three immediate points of note. Firstly, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument can also be employed to show that there are no (non-trivial) ‘negative’ (core) luminous mental states. This is because being in a position to know that these states obtain also requires a margin for error. So, the conditions of not being in pain, not feeling cold, and so on, are also non-luminous.
	Secondly, Williamson takes his margin for error principle ME to be derived from the following safety principle on knowledge:

(S) For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains, then in  it is not the case that: s believes, via M, that C obtains and it is not the case that C obtains, (where  is close to )

plus the doxastic principle:

(B) If s forms a belief, via M, in a case  then s could easily have formed this belief, via M, in a close (but distinct) case 

(see Williamson 2000, pp. 126-129). Very roughly, principle S says that one knows, via M, that C obtains only if one couldn’t easily have formed the false belief, via M, that C obtains. Principle B, as Williamson (2000, p. 127) notes, is supposed to capture the idea that ‘belief is not perfectly discriminating’—very roughly, belief has the tendency to spill over, as it were, to close (but distinct) cases. More specifically, if one forms the belief that C obtains in a certain case then there will always be some close (but distinct) case in which one also forms that belief via the same method.





There are various worries one might have with Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In the next few sections, I will merely focus on the following concerns: 

(1) The argument depends on a particular conception of reliability—a safety conception. It would be much better if a cogent argument against luminosity could be motivated on more neutral grounds.​[10]​
(2) Even if a safety conception of reliability is correct, nonetheless, on certain conceptions of knowledge, the safety principle S is too strong. If that is so, then the margin for error principle ME is likewise too strong—since ME entails S. But Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is only valid given such a strong version of ME (cf. Berker 2008).
(3) Related to the above worry, the argument depends on a particular conception of what it is for our powers of discrimination to be limited (as given by DIS1). Again, it would be better if a cogent anti-luminosity argument could be given which employed a more neutral conception.
(4) The use of principle B might be disputed (cf. Steup 2009).
(5) The argument cannot be used to undermine various weaker (and more plausible) principles. So, even if one takes Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to be sound one might nonetheless seek to defend a weaker form of the Cartesian Conception via one, or more, of these weaker principles.    


4. Strong and weak safety.

The safety principle S is a pretty demanding principle: a subject s in a case  fails to know, via M, that C obtains if there is just one case  which is close to  in which s forms the false belief, via M, that C obtains. Such a principle entails, for example, that I do not know that my ticket in the National Lottery will be a losing ticket when the draw is made, despite the overwhelming odds that it will be. That’s because in one close world my ticket is the winner. Likewise, the margin for error principle ME also rules out such knowledge. Most epistemologists think that safety and ME are getting the right results, even if they do not accept these very principles.​[11]​ But suppose one thinks that one can know that one’s ticket in the National Lottery will be a losing ticket, then both S and ME are too demanding.​[12]​ To allow for this, one natural weakening of S is:

(WS) For all cases , if in  s is in a position to know that C obtains then in nearly all (if not all) cases  it is not the case that: s believes that C obtains and it is not the case that C obtains, (where  is close to ).​[13]​

But now the most that can be derived from WS, together with B, is the following weaker margin for error principle:

(WME) For all cases , if in  s is in a position to know that C obtains then in nearly all (if not all) cases  C obtains, (where  is close to ).

But then there is no immediate route to establish SR as was done above. So, on certain weaker safety conceptions of knowledge, luminosity remains in the running—or so it seems.


5. Minimal margin for error principles.

As it turns out, WME can after all be used to undermine the luminosity principle but via a different form of argument than the one given by Williamson. To see why note that WME entails the following even weaker margin for error principle:

(MME) There is no case , , such that in  s is in a position to know that C obtains and in  s is in a position to know that C fails to obtain (where  is close to ).​[14]​

Call this a minimal margin for error principle. This principle provides an alternative and more general conception of what it is for close cases to be indiscriminable via introspection:

(DIS2): If one is in a position to know that one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one is in a position to know, via introspection, one is in '.

Indeed, given the factivity of being in a position to know, MME is entailed by, but does not entail, Williamson’s own strong margin for error principle ME. Likewise, DIS1 entails DIS2, but not vice versa.


6. Minimal margins for error and luminosity.

To use MME to undermine luminosity requires an assumption which is not required for Williamson’s own anti-luminosity argument to go through: namely, the assumption that if a positive mental state C is luminous then the corresponding negative state not-C is luminous too. This assumption is surely plausible.​[15]​ Given this assumption, the weak Cartesian Conception is committed to the following instances of L as applied to the state of feeling hot:

(L1) For all cases , if s feels hot in  then in  s is in a position to know that they feel hot.

(L2) For all cases , if s does not feel hot in  then in  s is in a position to know that they do not feel hot.

The relevant instance of MME then is: there are no cases , , such that in  s is in a position to know that they feel hot and in  s is in a position to have know that they do not feel hot (where  is close to ). Substituting, L1 and L2 in this instance of MME yields: there are no cases , , such that in  s feels hot and in  s does not feel hot (where  is close to ). But that is classically equivalent to the soritical conditional: for all , , if in  s feels hot then in  s feels hot.​[16]​ Given the phenomenal transition from feeling hot to not feeling hot we can thus derive a contradiction. The upshot is that even if one accepts a weaker conception of safety via WS, we can still motivate a weaker, and more generally acceptable, conception of what it is for our introspective powers of discrimination to be limited under which luminosity fails (at least given B, together with the assumption that if a positive mental state C is luminous then not-C is luminous too). We have thus found an anti-luminosity argument which is motivated on significantly broader grounds than Williamson’s own version.


7. Motivating anti-luminosity without safety or principle B.

The question then arises: do we need either B or any kind of safety principle to motivate an anti-luminosity argument? Recall that Williamson uses principle B, plus S to derive ME. Recall also that B amounts to the claim that ‘belief is not perfectly discriminating’. The use of B is somewhat odd. In the first-place, even if B is true, it doesn’t sit too well with Williamson’s own knowledge-first epistemology under which knowledge is the basic epistemological notion and belief is decidedly secondary.​[17]​ Here the worry is: how come insights about belief, and not knowledge, are underpinning the insight, along with safety, that our introspective powers of discrimination are limited? Does that worry depend on an unduly pure reading of Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology? Arguably not.
	In his (1990), Williamson (rightfully it seems to me) observes that the notions of discriminability and indiscriminability are, first and foremost, epistemic notions—notions which are canonically defined in terms of knowledge. So, surely the insight that the methods via which we form our introspective beliefs are less than perfectly discriminatory ought to be canonically given in terms of knowledge. But then Williamson merely needs to cash this claim out in terms of ME—he doesn’t need to go via the doxastic principle B together with the safety principle S. Moreover, if the basic insight behind the argument against luminosity is just that close cases are indiscriminable via introspection then arguably that insight is better captured via WME than via ME. How so?
	Williamson is concerned in his 1990 book with what may be termed with numerical indiscriminability. An updated version of his conception goes as follows: an object a and an object b are indiscriminable via method M just in case one is not in a position to know, via M, that a and b  are distinct.​[18]​ As it turns out, it is MME, and not ME is the qualitative counterpart of this numerical notion.​[19]​ So, the insight that close cases are qualitatively indiscriminable is best captured via MME and DIS2, and not the stronger principles ME and DIS1.   
	A further reason to dispense with principle B comes from reflecting on the fact that if B is taken to be at all plausible then the following principle is surely just as plausible:

(KB)  For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains, then, in , s believes, via M, that C obtains, (where  is close to ).

KB says, in effect, that if one knows that C obtains, via M, then it is not an easy possibility that one fails to believe, via M, that C obtains. KB enforces the following conception of limited discrimination:  

(DIS3) If one does not believe via introspection that one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one is in a position to know, via introspection, one is in '.

	Crucially, the strong margin for error principle ME follows directly from KB and S and so we can dispense with principle B in motivating ME. However, if KB is at all plausible the following weaker principle is surely very plausible:

(KNB)  For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains, then in  s does not believe that C does not obtain, (where  is close to ).

This principle enjoins the following conception of what it is for our powers of discrimination to be limited:

(DIS4): If one believes, via introspection, that one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one is in a position to know, via introspection, one is in '.  






Even if one accepts the soundness of an anti-luminosity argument which proceeds via the margin for error principle ME or via the minimal margin for error principle MME, one might still hope to save some form of the Cartesian conception of the mental via some weaker form of luminosity. There are three basic ways in which this strategy might be carried out: weaken the consequent of L, strengthen the antecedent of L, or do both.​[21]​ Here the focus will be mostly be on the first type of strategy.​[22]​
	One natural fallback luminosity principle exploits the notion of being in a position to have a justified belief rather than the notion of being in a position to know.​[23]​ The idea is that while our limited powers of discrimination undermine luminosity, they do not undermine the following weaker principle of J-Luminosity:

(JL) For all cases , if C obtains in  then in  s is in a position to have a justified belief, via introspection, that C obtains.

Can any form of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument be used to undermine JL (and so, in turn, L)?  It depends what is meant by ‘being in a position to have a justified belief’. If there is no gap between having a justified belief that C obtains and knowing that C obtains then Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument can also be used to undermine JL. However, suppose that being in a position to have a justified belief is weaker than being in a position to know. In particular, let us suppose that being in a position to have a justified belief is both non-factive and merely satisfies the following weaker safety principle:

(JS)  For all cases , if in  s is in a position to have a justified belief, via M, that C obtains, then in nearly all (if not all) cases  it is not the case that: s believes, via M, that C obtains and it is not the case that C obtains, (where  is close to ).​[24]​

Together with B, one can then derive the corresponding margin for error principle:

(JM) For all cases , if in  s is in a position to have a justified belief, via M, that C obtains, then in nearly all (if not all) cases , C obtains in , (where  is close to ).

Again, just as with the weak margin for error principle WME, it looks like there is no immediate route to establish a version of the soritical principle SR stated in terms of being in a position to have a justified belief. So, despite the validity of JS, J-luminosity looks to be in good standing and a weakened form of the Cartesian Conception remains in the running.


9. Against J-luminosity. 
 
However, a little reflection ought to show that, just as WME entails MME, JM entails the following (justificationist) minimal margin for error principle:

(MJM) There is no case , , such that in  s is in a position to have a justified, via M, belief that C obtains and in  s is in a position to have a justified belief, via M, that C fails to obtain (where  is close to ).

MJM is designed to capture the idea that our powers of discrimination are limited in the following sense:

(DIS5): If one is in a position to have a justified belief that one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one is in a position to justifiably believe, one is in '.​[25]​

Now, just as above, we have all the materials for an argument which shows that MJM plus JL entails that there are no cases , , such that in  s feels hot and in  s does not feel hot (where  is close to ) which, again, is classically equivalent to the soritical conditional: for all , , if in  s feels hot then in  s feels hot. (Assuming JL is taken to hold for both positive negative core mental states.) 





Perhaps the Cartesian has been looking in the wrong place. Perhaps the Cartesian conception of the mental is to be expressed using principles which do not (overtly) involve knowledge or justification, (and cognate notions) but rather is to be given in terms of principles involving belief. On that basis, one further fallback principle is the following doxastic principle:

(BL): For all cases , if in  one is in a core mental state (and one has considered the matter) then one believes, in  via introspection, that one is in such a state.​[27]​

But even this principle can be shown to be false. There are (at least) two arguments via which one can do this. The first proceeds via the following doxastic margin for error principle:

(BM) There is no case , , such that in  s believes, via M, that C obtains and in  s believes, via M, that C fails to obtain (where  is close to ).​[28]​

BM records the following purely doxastic conception of what it is for close cases to be indiscriminable. 

(DIS6): If one believes, via M, that one is in a case , and a case ' is close enough to , then for all one believes, via M, one is in '.

If BL applies to both positive and negative core mental states then, via substitution of the relevant positive and negative instances of BL into BM, we can derive there are no cases , , such that in  s feels hot and in  s does not feel hot (where  is close to ) which, again, is classically equivalent to the soritical conditional: for all , , if in  s feels hot then in  s feels hot. So, even BL it seems must be given up. Indeed, KL and JL both entail BL (if the subject is wondering whether C obtains), and so all forms of the Cartesian Conception we have considered so far will fail too.
	One immediate worry with this argument is that BM is simply false. Here the (plausible) thought is that surely introspection is such that a competent, normally functioning subject just can form the belief, via introspection, at time t, that they feel hot and a moment later form the belief, via introspection, that they do not feel hot. In other words, introspection just can and indeed often does yield contrary beliefs across close cases. But this reply will not help. If one doubts BM then one is also committed to a denial of MJM, since BM can be shown to entail MJM if BL is valid. How so?  
	Suppose BL applies to both the positive mental states of feeling hot and the negative mental state of not feeling hot as follows:

(BL1): For all cases , if in  one feels hot (and one has considered the matter) then one believes, in  via introspection, that one feels hot.
 
(BL2): For all cases , if in  one does not feel hot (and one has considered the matter) then one believes, in  via introspection, that one does not feel hot. ​[29]​

If introspection is a method via which we can gain knowledge of our mental states then the following principle ought to valid also:

(D) There is no case  such that in  s believes, via introspection, that C obtains and in  s believes via introspection that C does not obtain. 

Principle D just enforces the plausible thought that introspection, if at all reliable, should not issue in contrary beliefs in a single case. But then from D and from BL1 and BL2 we can derive the following principles of infallibility:

(IN1): For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one feels hot then in  one feels hot.

(IN2): For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one does not feel hot then in  one does not feel hot.

Note that we cannot derive BL1 and BL2 from IN1 and IN2 plus D.​[30]​ More generally, we can derive the following infallibility principle (which applies to both positive and negative core mental states):

(IN) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that C obtains then in  C obtains,


from D plus BL.
	But now note that IN and MJM entail BM (again ignoring the difference between knowledge and being in a position to know). But if BM is invalid, while MJM is in good standing, it follows that IN must be given up. Since, IN follows from BL together with D, then BL must be given up too. Thus, one cannot stabilise the Cartesian conception by retreating to BL. Indeed, there is a further, independent against BL which does not rely on the assumption that our introspective powers are discrimination are less than perfect.


11. The quick and dirty argument against both luminosity and omniscience.

Firstly, note that the luminosity principle L entails the following principle of omniscience: 

(KO) For all cases , if C obtains in  (and s has actively wondered whether or not C obtains) then in  s knows that C obtains.​[31]​
 
Secondly, given that knowledge entails belief, KO entails BL. Thirdly, given that L, KO, and BL are valid for both positive and negative core mental states, then from L we can derive BL1 and BL2. Fourthly, consider again the gradual phenomenal transition whereby s feels hot at time t and does not feel hot at time t plus one hour, such that at every stage of this transition s has wondered whether or not they feel hot. There are stages midway through the transition whereby no belief either way need be triggered—s neither believes that they feel hot nor believes that they do not feel hot despite having attentively and fully considered the matter. It’s seems perfectly acceptable for an alert, normally functioning, and competent subject to fail to reach a verdict either way and so withhold belief as to whether or not they feel hot. Given BL1 and BL2, a contradiction follows: if one fails to form the belief that one feels hot then via BL1, one does not feel hot. If one also fails to form the belief that one does not feel hot then, via BL2, it is not the case that one does not feel hot. So, BL must be given up, and since BL follows from L, then the luminosity principle L must be given up too. Equally, consider a gradual and slow onset of toothache. At each stage in the process one considers whether or not one feels pain. It seems perfectly acceptable for an alert, normally functioning, and competent subject, at certain stages midway in the transition, to refrain from forming a belief as to whether or not they are in pain—one might feel a faint throbbing in one’s tooth and yet feel unsure that this feeling amounts to a feeling of being in pain and unsure that this feeling does not amount to feeling in pain.
	Doubtless, many competent subjects, indeed perhaps most subjects, may not express such doxastic hesitancy. However, all that is required to get the anti-luminosity argument in hand to work is for there to be one subject, who is fully alert, fully competent with the concepts in question, who is functioning normally, who is given sufficient time to reflect as to whether or not they are in the core mental state, and yet refrains from forming a belief as to whether or not the core mental state obtains when that state does/does not obtain. This style of argument involves no overt appeal to reliability considerations or to a margin for error. Rather, the quick and dirty argument utilises a form of what Shoemaker (1996, p. 51) calls ‘first-person agnosticism’.​[32]​ Should one seek to deny that our introspective powers of discrimination are less than perfect then this quick and dirty argument remains effective.​[33]​ Moreover, note that JL entails the following version of omnsicience: 

(JO) For all cases , if C obtains in  (and s has actively wondered whether or not C obtains) then in  s has a justified belief that C obtains.

JO, like KO, entails BL. So, if BL (as applied to both positive and negative core mental states) fails because of first-person agnosticism, then JO fails too. 


12. Infallibility and the Cartesian Conception of the mental

Suppose one accepts all of the arguments given so far but one now proposes that the Cartesian Conception of the mental should simply validate the infallibility principle IN. Recall that while BL (as applied to both positive and negative core mental states) entails IN (given D), the converse entailment does not go through. So, it certainly looks like one could deny BL and L and yet retain IN. But is such an option really in the running? There does not seem to be any immediate (and uncontroversial) quick and dirty argument against IN as there is against BL. However, as it turns out, there are two kinds of arguments one can give against IN. The first involves principle KB (and so DIS3). The second, and arguably better argument, uses MME and the failure of BM. 

  
13. The anti-infallibility argument using KB.

Suppose that our introspective beliefs concerning positive and negative core mental states are infallible. Crucial question: is infallibility sufficient for knowledge? Since such beliefs are never false then arguably that fact is both necessary and sufficient for them to constitute knowledge. In other words, it is not a necessary condition that such beliefs are such as to also satisfy BL. So, if IN is valid (for both positive and negative mental states) it follows that the following principle is valid also:

(INK) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that C obtains then in  one knows that C obtains.

Now recall principle KB:

(KB)  For all cases , , if in  s is in a position to know, via M, that C obtains, then, in , s believes, via M, that C obtains, (where  is close to ).

KB together with INK entail the soritical principle SR (just as ME plus L entails SR). But since SR leads to a contradiction, and KB is in good standing, then INK must be given up. But since INK follows from IN then IN must be given up also. Indeed, since IN follows from BL (given D), and since BL follows from KO (or WO) which follows from L (or JL), this anti-infallibilty argument is also an anti-luminosity argument. Thus, KB is a much more interesting principle than ME since it can be used to undermine all of the Cartesian principles we have encountered so far. 


14. The master anti-infallibility and anti-luminosity argument.

Still, suppose one thinks that KB is too strong.​[34]​ Suppose, in particular, that one thinks that knowledge via introspection can tolerate a bit of unbelief, as it were, in close cases. Can we then still undermine all forms of the Cartesian Conception without using KB? We can. There is a master infallibility argument which proceeds via MME rather than KB. And since luminosity entails infallibility, this argument also functions as a master anti-luminosity argument also.
	The argument goes as follows: Take the introspective belief that one feels hot. Suppose that this belief is luminous: 

(1) For all cases , if s feels hot in  then in  s is in a position to know that they feel hot.

Moreover, plausibly, if positive introspective beliefs are luminous then so are negative introspective beliefs. And so, from 1 we have:

(2) For all cases , if s does not feel hot in  then in  s is in a position to know that they do not feel hot.

If one actively wonders whether or not one feels hot and one is in a position to know that one feels hot then one will know, and so believe that one feels hot. And so, from (1) and (2) we have:

(3) For all cases , if in  one feels hot (and one has actively considered the matter) then one believes, in  via introspection, that one feels hot.
 
(4) For all cases , if in  one does not feel hot (and one has actively considered the matter) then one believes, in  via introspection, that one does not feel hot.

(i.e. BL1 and BL2). But if introspection is at all reliable then it has better not issue in contrary beliefs in a single case. And so, the following principle, principle D, is valid:

(5) There is no case  such that in  one believes, via introspection, that one feels hot and in  one believes via introspection that one does not feel hot. 

From 3, 4, and 5, it follows, given some pretty simple logic, that these introspective beliefs are infallible:

(6) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one feels hot then in  one feels hot.

(7) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one does not feel hot then in  one does not feel hot.

(i.e. IN1 and IN2). Moreover, it is also highly plausible that all infallible beliefs constitute knowledge, and so any introspective belief which satisfies 6 and 7 will also satisfy:

(8) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one feels hot then in  one knows that one feels hot.

(9) For all cases , if one believes, in  via introspection, that one does not feel hot then in  one knows that one does not feel hot.

(i.e. the relevant instances of INK). Suppose further that our introspective powers of discrimination are less than perfect such that close cases are indiscriminable via introspection. That is, introspection is governed the minimal margin for error principle MME:

(10) There is no case , , such that in  one is in a position to know, via introspection, that one feels hot and in  one is in a position to know, via introspection that one does not feel hot (where  is close to ).

Given 8 and 9, this entails the doxastic limited discrimination principle BM (given that knowing entails being in a position to know):

(11) There is no case , , such that in  one believes, via introspection, that one feels hot and in  one believes, via introspection that one does not feel hot (where  is close to ).

But 11 is false. The method of introspection is such that competent subjects can and indeed just do form contrary beliefs across close cases (under normal conditions). Across a gradual phenomenal transition from feeling hot to not feeling hot, at one instant I may hold the belief, via introspection, that I feel hot, and yet, say, half a second later, I may now form the belief, via introspection, that I do not feel hot.​[35]​
	But since 11 is false and given that introspection is not perfectly discriminatory, it follows, together with the thesis that infallible beliefs constitute knowledge, that the belief that one feels hot and the belief that one does not feel hot are not both infallible. Indeed, since they are not both infallible, given that introspection does not yield contrary beliefs in any case, they not both luminous. Moreover, given that both or neither are luminous, and that both or neither are infallible, it follows that the belief that one feels hot is neither infallible nor luminous. We have thus shown that even considerably weakened forms of the Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable—and moreover, we have done so without appealing to anything like the strong margin for error principle ME.​[36]​ 
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^1	  The main ideas in this chapter were presented at: Bergamo (The Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy), ANU, Melbourne (AAP annual conference), Leeds, Nottingham, and St. Andrews. For very useful feedback, particular thanks go to: Ralf Bader, Selim Berker, Dave Chalmers, Josh Dever, Paul Dimmock, Padraig Graenfell, Jonathan Schaffer, Susanna Schellenberg, Declan Smithies, Daniel Stoljar, Michael Tye, and Crispin Wright. This work was begun while I was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the ARC funded Epistemic Warrant Project at ANU (2007-8) and completed while I was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the ARC funded Pragmatic Foundations of Language Project at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney. This chapter, and its companion piece ‘How to be a Neo-Cartesian’ (ms), are extracted from a longer paper of mine ‘Our Cognitive Homes’.
^2	  It is not entirely clear that Descartes himself held such a strong conception of the mental—though Williams (1978, pp. 84-5) tentatively attributes a version of such a view to Descartes, as does Dicker (1993 pp. 45-48). Locke (1690) seems to have held such a view when he says: ‘There can be nothing within the mind that the mind itself is unaware of’.
^3	  Further candidate core mental states include phenomenal conditions of the form it appears to one that p (see Williamson 2000, p. 96).
^4	  Cf. Shoemaker (1996, ch. 3). 
^5	  The term ‘introspection’, here and throughout, is used in a fairly theory-neutral sense. It is taken to encompass a variety of potential processes via which a subject is canonically able to become aware of, or form beliefs about, the occurrence of token mental states. Consequently, it is taken to apply to both core and non-core mental states. On such a minimal conception, we can remain neutral on a variety of issues. Namely, the issue as to whether introspection is an interpretative or inferential process (see e.g. Carruthers 2010, pp. 76-79); the issue as to whether introspection is akin to perception (see e.g. Armstrong 1968 pp. 323-338; Shoemaker 1986); the issue as to whether there is a plurality of introspective methods (see e.g. Schwitzgebel, this volume), and the issue as to the relationship between introspected and conscious states. (Cf. the much less minimal conception adopted by Carruthers 2010, pp. 76-79) 
^6	  The more subtle version of Williamson’s argument (2000 pp. 96-98) applies reliability considerations to degrees of confidence. For simplicity, I focus on the less subtle version.
^7	  Cases can be thought of as comprising a subject, s, a time, and a possible world. The quantifiers should be taken to range over physically and psychologically feasible cases for normally functioning human subjects. For the purposes of this paper, method M is introspection. 
^8	  For more on what it is to be in a position to know, see Williamson (2000, p. 95).
^9	  I here assume that for all one is in a position to know, C obtains entails one is not in a position to know that C does not obtain. 
^10	  S is questioned by Brueckner and Fiocco (2002) and Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004). It seems to me that the doubts raised in these papers against safety can be accommodated by recognising that whether or not a belief is safe is a highly time-sensitive matter.
^11	  One might, for example, accept a sensitivity conception of reliabilism under s knows, via M, that C obtains only if were C to fail to obtain then s would not believe, via M, that C obtains. Sensitivity and safety are independent conditions on knowledge (see Williamson 2000, ch.7 for some useful discussion).
^12	  Various forms of contextualism, for example, allow that one can know that the sentence ‘my ticket is a losing ticket’, as used in a low-standards context (where the stakes are low and the possibility of winning is not particularly salient), is true. On such conceptions, the relevant version of S cannot hold relative to such low-standards.
^13	  WS is still strong enough to ensure that in the Goldman-Ginet barn façade case, Henry does not know that he is looking at a barn. A version of WS is defended by Pritchard in his (2005, p. 163). 
^14	  Suppose there are two close cases ,  such that in  s is in a position to know that C obtains and in  s is in a position to know that C fails to obtain. Given WME, and the first conjunct of this supposition, C obtains in most of the close  cases. But if that is so, then in those cases, given WME, s is not in a position to know that C fails to obtain, contrary to the second conjunct of the supposition. Upshot: WME entails MME.
^15	  It is accepted by Shoemaker (1996, p. 51) and also Smithies (forthcoming) for example.
^16	  Even if one denies the classical equivalence because of doubts about classical logic then the principle ‘there are no cases , , such that in  s feels hot and in  s does not feel hot (where  is close to )’ still gives rise to a paradox: assume, for simplicity, that we have a one hundred case phenomenal transition from not feeling hot to feeling hot, and assume that in case 100 s does not feel hot and assume for reductio that in a case 99 that s feels hot. So, there is some case , and some case , such that in  s feels hot and in  s does not feel hot (where  is close to ). But that contradicts our principle and so we can conclude that in case 99 s does not feel hot. But then now assume for reductio that in case 98 s feels hot … and so on until we reach the absurd conclusion that in case 0, s does not feel hot. 
^17	  One may, of course, also question whether B is true (or indeed question whether one can really use B to get from the safety principle S to ME). I will not questions these assumptions here.
^18	  As Williamson notes, indiscriminability is better thought of holding not between objects per se, but between presentations of objects. This important insight does not matter for present purposes. The conception here is updated since in this earlier work Williamson speaks of activating the knowledge that a and b are distinct, rather than being in a position to know that a and b are distinct.
^19	  Proof: It is a given that: (1) for all , , if  =  then in , C obtains iff in , C obtains. From (1), via contraposition, we can derive: (2) for all , , if in , C obtains but, in , C does not obtain then  and  are distinct. Given that a subject s is in a position to know (2), then via distribution over , and closure and collection for being in a position to know, we have: (3) for all , , if s is in a position to know, in , that C obtains and s is in a position to know that, in , C does not obtain then s is in a position to know that  and  are distinct. Given contraposition, from (3) we get: (4) for all , , if s is not in a position to know that  and  are distinct then it is not the case that: s knows, in , that C obtains and s knows that, in , C does not obtain. Now, suppose that ,  range over close cases: (5) for all , ,  is close to . And suppose that close cases are numerically indiscriminable: (6) for all , , if  is close to  then s is not in a position to know that  and  are distinct. It thus follows from 4, 5, 6 that close cases are qualitatively indiscriminable: (7) for all close cases , , it is not the case that: s knows, in , that C obtains and s knows, in , that C does not obtain, which is equivalent to MME. Thus MME and not ME is the qualitative counterpart of Williamson’s notion of numerical indiscriminability.	` 
^20	  It might be thought that one reason to prefer ME over MME is that the former principle can be used to underline the KK principle while the latter principle cannot. However, in Greenough ‘Discrimination and Access Internalism’ (ms), I show that MME can undermine the KK principle while a correlate principle can undermine the JJ principle.
^21	  One might also restrict the range of the quantifiers in L, e.g. by having a more fine-grained conception of what constitutes a case or what constitutes a core mental state. I shall not be discussing such options here.
^22	  I discuss the second and third types of strategy in my ‘How to be a Neo-Cartesian’, ms.
^23	  This is effectively the notion of lustrousness defended in Berker (2008).
^24	  This notion of justification is such that while one cannot have a justified belief that one is standing before a barn in the standard Goldman-Ginet barn-façade case, one can nonetheless have a justified belief that one’s ticket is not the winning ticket in a fair lottery (and so the relevant version of multi-premise closure for justified belief fails). Note also that JS is neutral as to whether being in a position to have a justified belief that C obtains entails that C obtains.
^25	  MJM entails MME, (given that being in a position to know entails being in a position to have a justified belief), but not vice versa.
^26	  I take it that this point applies to a version of JL formulated using a propositional notion of justification as follows: (JL)* For all cases , if C obtains in  then in  s is justified in believing that C obtains. Smithies (forthcoming) defends the intriguing idea that JL when stated using propositional rather than doxastic justification is in fact valid. Accordingly, he also denies that there is a propositional justification version of MJM. There is not space to address such a proposal here but let me record the worry that a propositional justification reading of JL fails to capture much of what was wanted from the Cartesian conception of the mental in the first place since it allows that while one can be propositionally justified in believing that one is in a certain mental state and yet one cannot avail oneself of this justification to form a justified belief that one is in such a state. What then constitutes a propositional justification that C obtains above and beyond the fact that C obtains? 
^27	  This is often called self-intimation.
^28	  BM entails a version of MME (stated in terms of knowledge rather than in terms of being in a position to know), but not vice versa. Likewise BM entails a version of MJM (stated in terms of justified belief rather than being in a position to have a justified belief), but not vice versa. In other words, BM is a pretty strong principle.
^29	  In Shoemaker’s terminology (1996, p. 51), the state of feeling hot is strongly self-intimating if and only if it satisfies both BL1 and BL2, and weakly self-intimating if and only if it satisfies BL1. Shoemaker takes core mental states to be strongly self-intimating. 
^30	  Shoemaker (ref.) alleges that we can derive BL1 ad BL2 from IN1 and IN2 plus B when only the converse entailment is valid.   
^31	  Or perhaps better: s has done what s is in a position to do with respect to knowing whether or not the condition C obtains.
^32	  Reliability considerations may play a covert role in that epistemically successful subjects may have evolved to fail to form beliefs where there is a danger that their beliefs may be false.
^33	  Shoemaker finds such agnosticism plausible for certain mental states (such as whether the subject has an Oedipus Complex) but thinks that such agnosticism is totally implausible when it comes to ‘sensations and ordinary beliefs and desires’. It is clear, however, that Shoemaker is not considering cases where a sensation or core mental state obtains, but only very faintly. In such cases, first-person agnosticism is surely very plausible—hence the quick and dirty argument. Cf. Greenough (2005, p. 175) on ‘the problem of silence’.
^34	  Just as one might think that S and ME should be replaced with WS and WME, respectively.
^35	  Of course this is not to say that across all phenomenal transitions a subject goes from the belief that C obtains to the belief that C does not obtain across some close cases—sometimes one will simply go from belief that C obtains to a state of first-person agnosticism (as the quick and dirty argument shows). Rather, it is simply that a fully alert, rational, and normally functioning subject can and indeed on many occasions just does go from the belief that C obtains to the belief that C does not obtain across some close cases. Indeed, the phenomenon is akin to what subjects typically do in the so-called forced march sorites paradox; see Raffman (1994), Shapiro (2005).
^36	  A lingering worry may remain. Even if our introspective powers of discrimination are indeed less than perfect one might think that one cannot use that very thesis in a persuasive argument against either luminosity or infallibility. For example, one might take the minimal margin for error principle MME to be too close to a failure of luminosity, in argumentative space, as it were, for an anti-luminosity argument to have any suasive force. There are two replies. Firstly, note that this objection does not touch the quick and dirty anti-luminosity argument as this argument does not employ the thesis that our introspective powers of discrimination are less than perfect. Secondly, the weak Cartesian grants that introspection is less than perfectly discriminatory in respect of non-core mental states. Moreover, since the luminosity and infallibility principles are exceedingly strong principles, we need an independent argument from the weak Cartesian to show why introspection suddenly (and magically) becomes perfectly discriminatory with respect to our core mental states. In other words, the burden of proof is on the Cartesian to show why core mental states differ so dramatically from non-core mental states so as to allow core mental states to be luminous or infallible. In other words, in the absence of such an argument, we are entitled to assume that introspection is less than perfectly discriminatory with respect to both core and non-core mental states.
^37	  See Greenough ‘How to Be a Neo-Cartesian’, ms.
